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Abstract— Open technologies, decentralized computation and
intelligent applications enable the third-generation web, Web
3.0, thereby digitizing whole industries. The emerging Economy
of Things (EoT) will be based on software agents running on
peer-to-peer trustless networks that require a programmable,
regulation conform means of payment. We give an overview of
current solutions that differ in their fundamental values and
technological possibilities, like e.g. private-issued stablecoins,
DLT-issued electronic money and genuine cryptocurrencies.
Based on this analysis, we present the concept of justified
trust and propose to combine the strengths of the crypto
based, decentralized trustless elements with established and well
regulated means of payment, based on this concept, via a secure
external re-balancing interface.
Combining the advantages, e.g. lightweight, trustless, efficient
high frequency micro state transfers on the one hand, and
ease of use, widely spread, accepted alignment to a multitude
of regulative requirements, on the other hand, while neither
leading into a lock-in in any of the proposed solutions, nor
undermining the basic principles of the crypto-movement or
unnecessarily reinforcing the banking system provides a synergy
and the necessary flexibility for further evolution alongside
the regulative framework. This offers a regulation conform
transitional solution that can be implemented in the short term,
which enables companies to place their decentralized business
operations in a regulated environment.
The contribution of our work is twofold: First, we illustrate
and discuss different DLT-operable means of payment. Second,
our research proposes a novel hybrid payment solution by
interfacing trustless with justified trust combined generalized
state channels.
Keywords: Economy of Things, Blockchain, DLT, Trustless
channels, Justified trust, Means of Payment, Payment, Interface
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to improvements in crypto technologies adoption, it
is now possible to convert the emerging Internet of Things
(IoT) into an Economy of Things (EoT). Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT) is therefore capable to enable the EoT
in a decentralized way. The Economy of Things refers to a
heterogeneous hybrid digital economy of diverse participants
e.g. IoT devices, digital entities, software agents running in
the cloud and humans. This leads to the growth of more
and more socio-economic aspects, since machines or digital
representatives of humans will be able to enter binding
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agreements, and execute business transactions inclusive au-
tonomous payments[1],[2].
A digitized economy cannot strive properly without an
efficient settlement, payment functionality to enable the ex-
change of value. Today’s payment system are not built for ei-
ther human-to-machine nor machine-to-machine transactions
or immutable smart contract execution, while complying with
all regulatory and legal requirements. Traditional financial
service providers have struggled to evolve faster and cheaper
payment services that can operate across borders. Even if
the above-mentioned requirements could already be provided
through technological adaptation of DLT, the nation-state
specific regulative framework lags behind. Especially with
respect to payment and the underlying value presentation
through e.g. a cryptographic asset, a nation-state regulative
needs to be involved to fight against money laundering and
to sustain monetary sovereignty. However, for corporate con-
texts and widespread adaption there is still a quite high com-
plexity and regulative issues[3]. For corporates, the handling
and payment of cryptocurrencies causes expenses and poses
additional risks. On the one hand, high costs for adaptation,
e.g. issuing invoices in cryptocurrencies or adapting ERP
systems. On the other hand, neither the customer nor the
company is willing to accept the volatile exchange risk
associated with cryptocurrencies. This outlines the necessity
for a regulated, fiat-denominated payment solution that is
processable on a decentralized network. The question is how
to approach from ’where we are today’ with current standards
and regulation in order to prepare a continuous evolution
through transitional solutions.
Our paper provides an overview of current DLT-operable
means of payment and highlights the tension between the
different regulative, corporate’s and trustless requirements
when it comes to payment. In this context, we offer a
solution combining established means of payment with new
technological approaches, while both, being aligned with
regulation and not leading into a vendor lock-in. The re-
mainder of this article is structured as follows. In II, we
highlight important characteristics of means of payments in
a corporate context. Subsequent in Section III, we briefly
describe general means of payment, whereas in Section IV
we focus on DLT-operable means of payment. Based on our
observation in Section IV, we propose a hybrid DLT-operable
solution in V, and conclude the article in Section VI.
II. THE INDUSTRY’S PAYMENT NEEDS
Several requirements arise in order to get used as a means
of payment for the emerging EoT. The following section
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provides an overview from a corporates perspective, since
corporates need to fulfill a higher degree of regulation and
verifiability.
A. Properties of a Currency
A suitable currency should have following characteristics:
• unit of account
• exchange medium
• and a store of value
Businesses and consumers don’t want to be exposed to
unnecessary currency risk when transacting. Price stability
thus provides a certain degree of planning certainty, whether
with regard to production or currency risks. So far, cryp-
tocurrencies have been suitable as an exchange medium, but
not as a store of value. A token cannot represent a store of
value if it’s price fluctuates by 20-30% on a normal day[4].
A company seeks to minimize risks, be it raw materials,
investments or different means of payment. Especially in the
financial sector, foreign currency positions represent a high
risk potential. A company that uses cryptocurrencies as a
means of payment aim to avoid additional risks, e.g. with
regard to volatility. Certain instruments are used to minimize
fiat or foreign currency risks, but this is always associated
with additional effort.
B. Legal and regulatory compliance
An increasing number of companies are introducing cryp-
tographic assets, or tokens, into their business that create
new levels of risk. A lack of regulation can e.g. lead to
new business models being compromised by late or incorrect
regulation that carries additional business and reputational
risks. Europe has a set of regulation for dealing with cryp-
tocurrencies, which is still in a state of change and therefor
can change quickly from a regulatory point of view. The
Financial Action Task Force recently issued cryptocurrency
guidelines to ensure the technology is not used for financial
crimes like money laundering and terrorist funding1. In order
to get widely accepted and used as a means of payment, a
nation-wide regulation would be preferable. Detailed regu-
lation will certainly be a long process, due to the fact that
the technology itself is developing faster than the legislator’s
regulatory attempt. This leads to an increase in complexity
if it comes to cryptocurrency business adoption since no
international standards exist[5].
C. Interoperable and Accessible
Similar to the majority of financial innovations, which aim
to reduce the frictions in the financial system, cryptocurren-
cies have emerged to address the existing market frictions
stemming from the lack of a global trustless peer-to-peer
payment mechanism. If the means of payment is limited to
the use within one network, presented in IV-C.1, multiple
ecosystems will emerge. Within each of these ecosystems
there is less friction as opposed to the friction between
those ecosystems, comparable to the intranet and internet.
1In-depth: Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and
Virtual Asset Service Providers, https://bit.ly/3dMG4KY
This in turn means that companies have to connect their
businesses to more ecosystems, in turn, this will create more
friction. A successful means of payment needs a wide range
of acceptance. User do not want to hold different e-Money
token types, since no interoperability between those networks
is currently given. Customers would need to hoard several
means of payment in order to stay liquid, which in fact, is
not economically viable. Therefore, interoperability is a main
success driver of a means of payment. In addition, secure
provisioning of the means of payment plays a crucial role in
its acceptance, therefor minimizing the associated counter-
party risk is inevitable.
D. Fiat-denominated (Accountable)
Corporate denominate their invoices in fiat money, e.g.
Euro in the EU, and therefore, also their accounting and
ERP systems operate in Euro. The world at this point in
time, in which "traditional" corporates issue an invoice in
Bitcoin is not imaginable. Furthermore, a means of payment
denominated in fiat currency does not pose additional effort
to a company-specific accounting and clearing systems, since
this systems already handle fiat-denominated transactions on
a daily-basis.
III. MEANS OF PAYMENT
There are two types of means of payment. Legal tender and
other means of payment. Banknotes issued by the European
Central Bank and the national central banks are the only legal
tender in Europe, everything else (Card payment, e-Money,
Bitcoin), are other means of payment. In all countries, legal
tender is subject to compulsory acceptance by the creditor
(this is also referred to as an obligation to accept or a debt
discharging obligation to accept). All other legally compliant
means of payment are therefore free to choose between the
contracting parties2.
Money has established itself as the important means of
payment which is used as a coordination device for fa-
cilitating transactions in human societies by fulfilling the
role of a unit for the measurement of value across several
goods and services. It is expected that the ongoing trend
from direct human-to-human transaction to digital and even
instant payments will further accelerate. In addition, due
to the emerging digital human machine society, more and
more demand for human-to-machine and even machine-to-
machine payment will arise. New forms of digital money
and new means of payment are created, especially to address
the need for cost-efficient instant- and micro-payments. The
variety of digital means of payment has increased with the
development of cryptocurrencies and is linked to a significant
technological innovation. The continuous evolution of means
of payments has lead to a multitude of possibilities ranging
from physical nation-state to almost seamless non-nation
state digital value transfer.
2§ 128 Abs. 1 Satz 3 AEUV
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IV. STATUS QUO: DLT-OPERABLE MEANS OF PAYMENT
The following section provides an overview of current
DLT-operable means of payment. DLT-operable refers to
the ability of being digitally processable on a DLT. The
information needs to be transferred into a DLT network
in order to allow automation through e.g. smart contract
execution. Smart contracts would allow devices connected
to a DLT, to provide services e.g. on a pay-per-use basis.
The effects of a DLT-operable means of payment are there-
fore particularly promising in the context of the machine
economy, as illustrated in section I.
A. Genuine Cryptocurrencies
The lack of a global, censorship resistant currency al-
lowing for cost-efficient international instant- and micro-
payments has played a decisive role for the creation to
some of the most prominent use-cases of blockchain, namely
cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies enable the peer-to-peer
transfers of value in a trustless environment in a censorship-
resistant manner[6].
Cryptocurrencies belong to virtual currencies, a clear
distinction between regulated electronic money (e-Money)
and virtual currencies can be found in the unit of account. E-
money, which is bound by the traditional money format, has a
grounded legal foundation as contrary to virtual currencies3.
This highlights the aspect that dealing with virtual currencies,
in contrast to e-Money, can lead to regulatory barriers.
Comparable to fiat currencies, and in contrast to e.g.
gold, cryptocurrencies are created ex nihilo and have no per
se intrinsic value. However, fiat currencies are based on a
nation state - or union of nations - specific issuance by a
central authority, namely the central banks. Therefore, per
construction, fiat currencies provide a centralized point of
control.
In contrast to that, cryptocurrencies can be understood
as a digital representation of a market-side assigned value
through the use of trustless technologies like DLT[7]. The
construction, in a nutshell founding on non-nation-state
related, decentralized control and transaction handling, is
therefore fundamentally different. It is important to note that
this difference actually mainly accounts for the market-side
assigned value.
The lack of centralized- and nation-state specific point of
control, regarded as desireable properties by the community,
however in turn is the reason for which cryptocurrencies
are often considered a threat to the conventional, centralized
banking system. The threat lies therefore in the unavailability
of central, nation-state specific control, rather than being
based on digital or even decentralized technologies itself.
In fact there are examples of cryptocurrencies based on
decentralized technologies, nevertheless providing a central-
3The E-money directive (EMD) defines electronic money as “electron-
ically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a
claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of
making payment transactions. . . , and which is accepted by a natural or legal
person other than the electronic money issuer”.
ized point of control4. However, this undermines the basic
principles of genuine cryptocurrencies and the main reason
for their inherent value[8].
Obviously, in case the adoption of decentralized controlled
cryptocurrencies reaches a certain threshold, this could pose
a threat to the established financial system, by having an
impact on the realization of monetary policy[9] and trans-
mission mechanisms[10].
While the technological and fundamental, financial system
related implications of such currencies, especially of Bitcoin,
has attracted much attention, so far, there has been little
discussion about the further limitations hindering a broad
application in corporate contexts. Most prominently, volatil-
ity is still a common feature. The daily fluctuations, as well
as the frequent spikes and crashes prevent these currencies
among other reasons, to be used in daily transactions, such
as buying goods or services. The usage of such currencies
would mean an additional exchange risk, as mentioned in
section II.
As decentralized networks and cryptocurrencies become
more widely adopted, corporations will need to ensure they
can handle new payment methods and offer a variety of
DLT-operable payment options. Companies need to set up
a infrastructure to conduct a thorough legal and compliance
analysis related to customer identity, taxation, liquidity, or
other regulated issues. Additionally, accounting and cashflow
systems need to be adjusted, especially if the company will
be holding cryptocurrency for an extended time[11].
Nevertheless, Bitcoin and similar payment tokens have
been classified as financial instruments by the Federal Fi-
nancial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) in the form of units
of account5, these tokens are classified equivalent to foreign
currencies and can be used in today’s business transactions,
but are not legal tender. This view is also shared by the
European Banking Authority (EBA).
B. Stablecoins
In this section we explain the basic properties of sta-
blecoins. For an in-depth view we propose literature [12],
[13], [14]. Stablecoins are a special representation of cryp-
tocurrencies and solve the issue of volatility. This kind of
cryptographic assets are developed with the aim of min-
imising price volatility by embedding a stability mechanism.
Volatility is still a main hurdle for the widespread adoption as
consumers and businesses require stability as a prerequisite
for using any type of currency. In general, three different
types of stablecoins exist:
• Collateralised stablecoins: On-chain
• Collateralised stablecoins: Off-chain
• Algorithmic stablecoins
The distinguishing characteristics between the three types
are the stability mechanism and the nature of the collateral.
Many stablecoins use the same mechanisms as current fiat
4e.g. Amazon Quantum Ledger Database (QLDB),
https://aws.amazon.com/de/qldb/
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currencies such as a currency basket, dollar pegs and a
currency boards which are either centrally or decentrally
managed[12]. A risk, agents who act as designated market-
makers may have significant market power and the ability to
bias the stablecoin price. This leaves open the potential for
market manipulation. At the same time, there is an unsolved
oracle issue, since the managed stablecoin relies on a third-
party for price feeds in order to maintain the price of the
stablecoin to an external peg[14].
Global stablecoins (GSCs), like Libra6, can have far-
reaching consequences from an economic point of view.
GSCs widely used as a store of value, could have adverse
effects on the transmission of monetary policy of domestic
interest rates and credit conditions. Furthermore, implications
of currency substitution would pose a threat to monetary
sovereignty[13]. The Bank for International Settlement (BIS)
has convened a G7 working group on stablecoins to better
understand and assess the potential and risks. The G20
Financial Stability Board (FSB) has published a study on
stablecoins, according to which they have the potential to
be a threat to the global financial system. The German
government, for example, has decided to oppose privately
emitted stable tokens7.This shows that regulators are even
critical to non global constructions of stablecoins and cross-
jurisdictional effort would be needed to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing.
In summary, it can be said that regulators struggle with the
decentralized nature of genuine cryptocurrencies due to the
lack of a central control element. Whereas with stablecoins,
the threat lies in the steadily substitution of the domes-
tic currency and the weakening of monetary transmission
mechanisms. Given the regulatory landscape, it seems likely
that regulators will not accept a stablecoin that has global
scale[15].
C. DLT-issued e-Money
The defining characteristic of e-Money is the digitized
representation of traditional legal tender, but is no legal
tender. From a traditional financial system’s point of view,
such an approach eliminates the downsides of genuine cryp-
tocurrencies: the issuer provides a central point of control,
is well aligned with the nation states monetary sovereignty,
provides stability of value (with respect to the underlying fiat
currency) and could be classified as legal tender. However,
from a genuine trustless DLT-based point of view, e-Money
is just that: a digitized representation of traditional, nation
state legal tender associated with all deficiencies which the
DLT movement seeks to overcome. It would be categorized
a off-chain collateralised stablecoin. From such a point of
view, the fact that DLT technologies are used for efficiency
reasons does not, even not to some extend, address the main
issues.
We will call this type of currency, DLT-issued e-Money,
which can be regarded as nation-state specific, regulated,
6In-depth: https://libra.org/
7In-depth: Federal Ministry of Finance, "Joint Statement on Libra", 2019
fiat-backed stablecoin or simply, programmable money. The
following part explains the different design options on how
"e-Money" can be issued on a DLT.
1) DLT-issued e-Money by Intermediaries: Intermediaries
are currently able to transform fiat currencies onto a DLT sys-
tem by tokenizing fiat money deposited at banks or payment
institutions. By intermediaries we mean regulated banks or e-
money institutes, that are required to comply with strict safe-
guarding requirements to protect customers8 Comparable to
the established banking system, the issuer provides a central
point of control, and the central regulation forms the source
of trust. Currently, there are a set of providers which e.g.
issue Euro-denominated tokens on a private-permissioned
networks. The reason for issuance on private-permissioned
networks lies in the possibility for preserving central control
over the underlying network and technology. Staying as close
as possible to the established financal system’s architecture,
on the one hand is believed to be the most direct approach
to legal compliance. However, the approach strongly deviates
from the genuine cryptocurrency fundamentals.
To give two examples, the Commerzbank issues their e-
Money token on R3 Corda9, whereby the startup Cash-
on-Ledger issues e-Money on the Alastria private-10. Both
companies provide proprietary models of a programmable
Euro that lack interoperability. Without a generally accepted
standard, multiple fractional ecosystems will emerge and the
advantage of money, being a unit of account and medium of
exchange will vanish. Additional, this solutions could bear
the risk of a lock-in effect for corporates.
The DLT-issued e-Money must be 100 percent-backed,
that means, reserves in fiat currency are stored off-chain in
a bank account. Holders of these stablecoins must trust the
issuer that all tokens are fully covered by fiat money deposits
and that they could actually "pay out" their claim to fiat
money in the same amount even in the case of an emergency.
The central point of control offers a central point of attack
since governments can simply shutdown by freezing the
reserves held, if these issuer reach global scale. Furthermore,
since the assets held as reserves are liquid, they pay no or
very low interest, which offers less profitability for the issuer.
In order to make money, the issuer of DLT-issued e-Money
needs to engage in fractional reserve banking, which is then
not much different from traditional banking[12].
2) DLT-issued e-Money by Central Banks (CBDC): A
CBDC, simply put, can be seen as digitised cash. The
European Central Bank (ECB) defines CBDC as “a liability
to a central bank that is made available to individual citizens
in digital form”. CBDCs would thus represent a third form of
central bank money, alongside banks’ reserves at the central
bank and physical cash[16].
CBDC’s would provide a central point of control and
preserve nation states monetary sovereignty, on the one
hand. Furthermore, the choice of design for a CBDC can
8In-depth: Article 7 of the E-Money Directive.
9Main Incubator, https://bit.ly/3bp06Kj
10Cash on Ledger, https://bit.ly/2YUksIF
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even prevent the risks of the traditional fractional reserve
banking system. By offering competition for bank deposits,
the adoption of a CBDC could limit the practice of fractional
reserve banking, thereby strengthening financial stability.
To achieve this, various design approaches are currently
being discussed. Therefore, with this regard they would,
from a genuine DLT point of view, be preferable compared
to intermediary issued e-Money. Regardless of the design,
CBDCs would comply with current regulation[17]. Currency
sovereignty is part of state sovereignty, so a central control
point remains unavoidable. Whether or not the technology
used is decentralized is irrelevant.
CBDCs might have broad implications for the efficiency,
stability and structure of the financial area. CBDC’s would
expand the variety for monetary policy mechanisms, e.g.
variable interest rates would provide a new, non-redundant
monetary policy instrument that could improve the overall
effectiveness of monetary policy[18]. A central-issued CBDC
could directly compete with commercial bank deposits, al-
leviate likely inducing a partial shift of deposits away from
commercial banks towards the respective central bank. In
turn, this might bear potential risks for the financial system.
This may significantly reduce the concentration of liquid-
ity and credit risk in payment systems, resulting in a safer
financial system, with less scope for impairment in monetary
policy transmission[19].
V. HYBRID DLT-OPERABLE PAYMENT ADAPTER
A. Preliminary Considerations
From a corporate entities’ point of view, as discussed
in the foregoing sections, all the above means of payment
are related to one or several drawbacks. To sum up, legal
compliancy is a must and can best be achieved by staying as
close as possible to the established banking system. However,
fundamental values and technological possibilities related to
DLT operable means of payment are quite tempting and form
the basis for the transformation of the internet of things into
a sound digital socio-economy.
For corporates, adopting a new form of payment in the day
to day business is an involved and costly matter. Regulative
issues, volatility and missing broad adoption by the normal
user, on the one hand, and the risk to get locked-in a
specific solution or having invested in the adoption of a
non-prevailing technology, provide a context with much
uncertainty, which in turn hinders adoption.
In order to overcome this, we propose to combine the
strengths of the crypto based, decentralized trustless elements
with established and well regulated means of payment. As we
will discuss in the following, this is no contradiction leading
to unnecessary overhead, but resembles a synergy combining
the advantages (e.g. lightweight, trustless, efficient high
frequency micro state transfers on the one hand, and ease
of use, widely spread, accepted alignment to a multitude
of regulative requirements, on the other hand) while neither
leading into a lock-in in any of the proposed solutions, nor
undermining the basic principles of the crypto-movement
or unnecessarily reinforcing the banking system. In fact,
the proposed approach can be interpret as a starting point
providing simple adoption for private and corporate users,
while allowing for seamless evolution.
In the following section, we will outline the individual
elements and discuss their fusion.
B. Trustless Channels
Naive application of DLT does not per se provide cost-
and time efficiency. Using e.g. on-chain transfer of value via
established blockchains is not in every case cost efficient,
nor instant. Payment-, state- and generalized state channels
are highly promising approaches, intended to reduce the
number of required on chain interactions of distributed apps
(dApps). A good overview of (generalized) state channels
can be found in [20][21]. The underlying interactions may
be implemented in a trustless and secure manner, based on
a number of different approaches like e.g. time- & hash
locks [22][23], forceMove[24] or Perun[25]. There also exist
multiple extensions for increased on-chain efficiency and for
N participants, see e.g. [26][27]. All these constructions have
in common, that they establish the possibilities for secure
offchain (and therefore time- and cost efficient) transactions,
while preserving security in a trustless way, by adequate
anchoring on DLT systems. We refer to all of these con-
structions as trustless channels in the following.
C. Justified trust
The state of the art for trustless channels is, on the one
hand quite powerful, however, requires all parties to actively
take part in the channel and staking an adequate value
(which is in fact the source of security). This is not in
every case desired by the participants of interaction networks
(e.g. users dislike buying and holding volatile cryptovalues
in order to be able to stake them for funding trustless channel
constructions).
On the other hand, there exists a large set of solutions
for secured interaction in the pre-DLT world. The security
thereby is not provided in a trustless/pre-funding fashion, but
by regulation, laws, and contracts based upon this.
For example, bank regulation is involved (and often re-
garded as burden by the crypto community), however inter
alia serves the purpose to provide trust for the client. Ex-
amples include deposit protection and the guarantee that the
bank can not causelessly debit an amount of value from a
clients account.
Trust is provided by, from the viewpoint of the trustee-
user relation, external enforcement of conformity with the
given rules. In case one of the trustees (in the above
example a bank) does not follow the rules, the customers,
interest groups or responsible authorities can punish the
misbehaviour and might even guarantee for a possible loss
the customer might have otherwise. The user therefore, on a
justifiably basis, can have trust in the trustee. Alternatively,
the users might regard a certain level of trust as sufficient for
certain interactions, e.g. transfer of a small amount of value,
for wich the given level of trust is justifiable.
5
We refer to these settings in the following as justified
trust. More specifically, justified trust based on the regulative
framework, in case means for enforcement is provided by the
regulative framework and justified trust due to reasonable
context in case the individual user regards the given level of
trust reasonable in relation to the possible loss.
D. Compliancy with regulations and established business
practice
In addition to the aspect of justified trust, beneficial to the
individual participants, the approaches for secured interac-
tion in the pre-DLT world are, in fact, involved solutions to
a multitude of socio-economic requirements (in addition to
bank regulation), like e.g. anti money laundering, and tax
regulations. Although the crypto scene criticises the estab-
lished solutions as too complex and rigid, the complexity and
rigidness, at least a good part of it, is an effect of necessary
fulfillment of these manifold regulative requirements.
On the other hand, for crypto based approaches, it is today
at least unclear if and how the regulative requirements are
to be applied. This is due to the fact that most often, the
current form of the letter of the law dates back to a pre-
DLT time. Recent adaptions of regulations (like adaption of
the European AML directive11) however demonstrate that the
spirit of the law is just as well to be applied to crypto based
approaches. The letter of the law will eventually reflect this,
at the latest as soon as the business volume gets reasonably
large.
In addition, even though, smart contract tamper-proof ex-
ecution provides the necessary verifiability in order to assert
legal effects, and can be very useful in contractual settings,
like automated execution of a contractual clauses, smart
contracts are by definition no legal contracts and therefore
not in every case sufficient for legal business. Smart contract
based business models, operated by corporates therefore
require to be embedded in a legal framework[28].
E. Interfacing trustless channels and justified trust systems
Based on these insights, we propose to interface trustless
channels with justified trust systems as follows. Figure 1
provides an illustration of the related architecture.
The regulative framework (illustrated as green area in
Fig.1) and legal contracts based upon it (blue arrow) provide
an embedding context within which the on-boarding of the
individual participants can be performed on a sound basis.
The high frequency interactions (dashdotted red arrow) be-
tween the individual participants are then handled efficiently
via trustless channels (yellow area). The value assignment to
the related crypto units of account, e.g. in relation to a given
fiat currency, might, e.g. for straightforward conformance
with existing regulations, be based on the underlying legal
contracts. The application scope might also be well defined
and possibly (initially) limited. This provides a steerable
approach towards fulfillment of regulative requirements. In
an extreme form, the trustless channel part can be regarded
11Anti-money laundering (AMLD V) - Directive (EU) 2018/843
Fig. 1. High-level architecture for trustless - justified trust combined
systems. The connecting arrow coloured in blue illustrates a mutual agree-
ment, based on the regulative framework. The arrows colored black indicate
flow of information, whereas the elements coloured red consider the actual
payment transaction. The green arrow represents the channel re-balancing.
See the text for a discussion.
as crypto based, secure high frequency book keeping with
no actual flow of value.
On a lower frequent basis (indicated by the red arrow), the
resulting change of balance - related to an assigned value -
can then be compensated via a channel-external, and in the
context of the regulative framework established means of
payment. We categorize the external means of payment in
three basic classes (gray boxes), namely trustless, justified
trust based on the regulative framework and justified trust
due to reasonable context (see section V-C for details).
The interaction with the channel-external payment is de-
signed such, that the corresponding channel is re-balanced
accordingly (green arrow). The required interface to the
state channel thereby is realized by application of the usual
building blocks of trustless constructions (like signed and
counter-signed messages). Provided that the external mes-
sage is based on another trustless system, or justified trust is
given (e.g. a bank confirming receipt of an payment in favour
of her client), the value transfer can be regarded as reasonable
secure. Therefore, as usual with state channels, the individual
user controls his security himself by accepting only external
means of re-balancing which are based on reasonable trust.
The required trust-level can be chosen on a per channel- or
even per re-balancing basis.
We provide detailed protocols for the external re-balancing
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interface in VII-A.
In a nutshell, secure interaction based on stake at risk
and counter-signed and prooveable agreements, allows for
dealing with dishonest participants and dispute resolution, as
usual with trustless channels. These characteristics are effec-
tive up to the counterparts of the justified trust based payment
system, e.g. the banks of Alice and Ingrid, respectively, in
the example in Fig.1. At that level however, the stake at risk
for the counterparts of the external re-balancing (e.g. the
banks), is not an explicit stake in the trustless channel, but
is realized by the embedding regulative framework. In case
of a dispute, every participant can proof the actual truth in a
trustless fashion and thereby assert their rights, at any point
in time. See VII-A for a detailed discussion.
An example for an existing justified trust based transfer
system would be the harmonized financial infrastructure of
the eurosystem, discussed in section VII-B.
The steerability of regulation-related aspects, e.g. the
application scope, and the required trust-level, as well as the
flexibility to choose any (legal) form of payment the user
agree upon, even on a per payment basis, allows to legally
operate the solution concept on the basis of the current
regulative framework, while providing the possibility for
effortless continuous enhancement alongside the evolution
of the regulation12. In addition, the risk of getting locked-in
a specific means of payment is strongly reduced.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Fundamental values and technological possibilities related
to DLT operable means of payment are quite tempting and
form the basis for the transformation of the internet of things
into a sound digital socio-economy. However, for corporates,
adopting a new form of payment in the day to day business
is an involved and costly matter. Regulative issues, volatility
and missing broad adoption by the normal user, on the one
hand, and the risk to get locked-in a specific solution or
having invested in the adoption of a non-prevailing tech-
nology, provide a context with much uncertainty, which in
turn hinders adoption. Therefore, we argue, that, from a
corpoate’s point of view, the status quo of DLT-operable
means of payment is related to several drawbacks.
In order to overcome this, we present the concept of justi-
fied trust and propose to combine the strengths of the crypto
based, decentralized trustless elements with established and
well regulated means of payment, based on this concept, via
a secure external re-balancing interface.
Combining the advantages, e.g. lightweight, trustless, ef-
ficient high frequency micro state transfers on the one hand,
and ease of use, widely spread, accepted alignment to a
multitude of regulative requirements, on the other hand,
while neither leading into a lock-in in any of the proposed
solutions, nor undermining the basic principles of the crypto-
movement or unnecessarily reinforcing the banking system
12In the example of Fig.1, this would be related to inclusion of further
instances of means of channel-external payment, currently non-existing or
beeing in an unclear status relative to regulation, indicated by the white area
on top, into the green area.
provides a synergy and the necessary flexibility for further
evolution alongside the regulative framework.
An already today practicable approach, based on our
proposal, would e.g. be relating the value assignment to reg-
ulated, nation-state specific fiat currencies. Trustless channel
technologies are then used to prevent fraud, while at the
same time enabling high-frequency transactions. For the low-
frequency, off-chain based re-balancing, regulators occupy
the control points (Fiat-In, Fiat-Out), which provides com-
pliancy to KYC/AML requirements. Such an approach would
work well for use-cases where several micro transactions
lead to a reasonable amount of value to be externally re-
balanced on a low frequent basis, e.g. customer settlement
on a weekly or monthly basis. Off-chain re-balancing would
currently be problematic in case the amount is below minimal
amount of value to be technically transferable (e.g. below 1ct
in the banking system) or below the economic viable limit
(due to the related cost of the transfer). Expressed pointedly,
the approach is currently not best suited for singular micro
transfer with the requirement of instant settlement. It is how-
ever to be noted that this limitation is due to regulation, and
not caused by the underlying technology. On the contrary,
the proposed approach provides high flexibility for efficient
evolution alongside the regulative framework and preventing
the emergence of multiple fractional ecosystems.
Implementing operable solutions in compliancy with ex-
isting regulations already today, even in a quite limited form,
in addition, allows to support the further development of
the regulative framework in a constructive and consensual
manner.
VII. APPENDIX
A.
In the following, we illustrate the protocol steps for the ex-
ternal re-balancing interface based on a simple building block
of trustless channels, namely a channel between Alice and
Ingrid. We intentionally selected the name Ingrid as opposite
participant to illustrate that our construction can be used as
building block for more complex channel networks (in which
Ingrid would e.g. act as intermediary). Our approach can
be used together with a wide set of channel construction
schemes. See section V-B for references.
For simplicity, we start by assuming an already estab-
lished (funded) trustless channel between Alice and Ingrid
(established as usual in the individual protocols). Note that
the following extra steps for our extension could also be
partly included in the opening / on-chain anchoring of the
trustless channel and might be applied from simple channel
constructions (no virtual channels or channel networks), up
to n-participant, recursive virtual networks.
We however illustrate the steps based on the current state
of the art in which Alice and Ingrid are able to agree
(without on-chain operations) on new rules, documented as
smart contracts, vice versa signed-of by the participants. In
addition, we only discuss a single state X and the transfer
from Alice to Ingrid (related to re-balancing X from Ingrid
to Alice).
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Suppose Alice and Ingrid started with an initial state
XA = 20, XI = 10 and had some interaction which resulted
in XA = 10, XI = 20.
Usually, at some point in time the channel would be
closed, allowing Ingrid to freely access and spend the
received 10. However, in many circumstances, this is not
desirable as:
• it may be related to extra effort (e.g. on-chain transac-
tions)
• it may be regarded as value transfer which is related to
AML, tax and other regulations
• the state value per se has no real value, but this value
is only agreed upon by a (civil law based) contract
between Alice and Ingrid (the trustless channel only
provides a trustless, unforgeable way of bookkeeping
for interactions between Alice and Ingrid)
To circumvent this, we make use of a justified trust based
approach to let Alice send Ingrid the equivalent value of
10, in a channel-external way and securely re-balance the
trustless channel accordingly (instead of closing it). To do
so, care must be taken to prevent loss of value for any
participant.
Suppose the justified trust based possibility (related as
external transfer in the following) would be bank transfer.
Alice is customer of Bank BA, while Ingrid’s bank shall be
BI . Suppose further Alice wants to transfer the equivalent
value of 10 to Ingrid, such that the channel can be re-
balanced to XA = 20, XI = 10.
The following steps need to be implemented in the under-
lying channel framework. The exact implementation depends
on the channel construction, e.g. hash-time-locked, dApp
based etc. The given description needs to be translated
accordingly to the framework at use.
Initiation
Alice informs Ingrid about her wish to achieve re-
balancing of the channel via external transfer. Her message to
Ingrid contains the channel specific information (depending
on the specific channel construction) and, in addition, it may
include a concretization about the method and conditions of
the external transfer, the value equivalent etc. Alice signs-of
this proposal (as usual). We refer to this message signed by
Alice as mA1.
If Ingrid agrees, she sends Alice a verifiable accepted
signal (e.g. a countersigned version of the original message
from Alice) mA1I1.
Once Ingrid agreed, 10+CI of Ingrid are locked such that,
after an agreed upon time, if nothing else happens, 10 +CI
are credited back to XI (preventing loss or indefinitely long
lock of her asset). C thereby relates to an extra collateral,
which could be any non negative value (including 0). Alice
might analogously lock a collateral CA. The values are
locked such, that, under certain circumstances (e.g. either
providing or failing to provide a specific proof / certificate),
a timer for timeout is reset or values are credited to the
participants.
Note that, depending on the underlying channel construc-
tion the value might be transferred actively locked in a
separate escrow contract, or only virtually (as with virtual
channels [26]).
Registration of valid sources of external information
Assuming Alice and Ingrid agreed upon external value
transfer via the banking system, BA and BI need to be
registered in the channel as senders of certificates (e.g. via
signed messages). This could either be anchored in the DLT
level contracts, in any derived (virtual) channel, or in the
concrete dApp anchored on the A-I channel, even on a per
re-balancing procedure.
External transfer
Next, Alice can trigger the external transfer to Ingrid.
Based on the level of presumed justified trust (e.g. Alice
and Ingrid can trust the banking system as a whole, namely
Ingrid can trust certificates issued by Alice’s Bank BA and
vice versa or Alice trusts her bank and Ingrid BI only,
etc.), several protocol alternatives for the external transfer
are possible.
Alternative 1
Alice and Ingrid have justified trust in the framework
around BA and BI .
Alice sends mA1I1 to BA, BA checks if she is correctly
registered as valid source of information. If not she can
ignore Alices message (Alice could even get punished for
false messages). If not further action by BA occur, after a
timeout, Ingrid receives back her 10 + CI , and Alice might
loose her CA (transfered e.g. to Ingrid as compensation for
the agreed transaction not beeing executed).
If however BA accepts mA1I1, she triggers the transfer to
BI (the security of this transfer is provided by justified trust
in the banking system) and provides to Alice and Ingrid a
certificate documenting that the transfer has been triggered
(Cert1).
In a first design, this certificate could act as releasing the
locked 10 to Alice and the collaterals back to the respective
parties (as it is expected that the banking system securely
transfers the equivalent value, and in case not, options for
external enforcement are provided, see also the following
discussion).
In a second design, this certificate triggers the transition
to a second locking stage as follows. We will have a look at
the optimistic case first. If everything goes as expected, the
value is transferred from BA to BI within tactualTransfer.
Once BI receives the value on behalf of Ingid, she confirms
the receipt to Alice and Ingrid, e.g. provides a certificate
Cert213. If the certificate is valid, the locked 10 are credited
to Alice and the collaterals back to the respective parties.
In case BI and I fail to confirm receipt of value within
ttransferMax, while Cert1 is valid, Alice is credited 10+CI
(the extra collateral as compensation for the waiting).
Due to regulation, BA and BI are part of a sub-system
having rules and punishment for incorrect or missing transfer.
13Note that BI is also registered as valid source of information.
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For example in case BI does not credit the value to Ingrid’s
acount, Ingrid can proof and enforce her claim by showing
Cert1 to a regulative authority. Possible extra evidence from
within the banking system can then be used to decide if e.g.
BA did maliciously confirm but not execute the transaction,
or BI did in fact receive but not credit the value to Ingid’s
account. The malicious party can then be punished.
Alternative 2
Everybody trusts her bank only.
In this case, if BA accepts mA1I1 as valid, she informs
BI about the desired transfer via mA1I1BA1. This message
can also go to Alice and Ingrid and can reset the timer for
the re-transfer of 10 to Ingrid (as Alice made a step, namely
triggered the transfer). If BI agrees, she documents this by
sending mA1I1BA1BI1.
This message could trigger the release of 10 to Alice and
the collateral’s back to the respective parties (comparable to
the first design).
Alternatively, mA1I1BA1BI1 could trigger the change of
locking conditions, and a receive certificate (cert2 above)
based unlocking could be applied, as described above.
Remarks
There exist many different options for application of
punishment via collateral, timing and release of fractions
of locked values, depending on individual participant’s be-
haviour, which can be choosen and agreed upon by the
participants.
In addition, note that BA and BI might also take part in
funding and locking in the underlying state channels. This
however, on the one hand would require the external transfer
partners to be part of the underlying legal contracting, which
is not desirable from a viewpoint of flexibility. To recap
section V-B, the participants should be able to choose any
legal external value transfer mechanism, possibly becoming
available even after the channel network is established. On
the other hand, the banks already have stake at risk, and
adjudication and punishment of misbehavior is provided by
the regulative framework.
B.
The Eurosystem has built with the Single European Pay-
ment Area (SEPA) a harmonized financial infrastructure. The
SEPA network would provide a justified trust system, that
can be used as a source for an actual and external value
transfer in a regulated manner, is available to all bank account
holder, integrated into corporates infrastructure and "effi-
cient". Modifications and extensions to the current operating
SEPA schemes will evolve, based on their supplement rather
than total replacement. SEPA money transfers can mainly be
executed within one day, and sometimes almost real-time if
we look at SEPA instant payment. In addition, in 2018, EBA
Clearing set up a task force to develop a uniform European
standard for Request-2-Pay (R2P) based on ISO 20022. By
using Request-2-Pay (R2P), a trigger mechanism initiated
by the payee, payment can be made more secure. This offers
the advantage over the normal bank transfer that the payment
cannot be reversed within 8 days. The payee thus has a lower
risk of payment default. Such improvements thus enhance the
efficiency and lower payment defaults within a justified trust
system[29].
9
REFERENCES
[1] B. Herd, and N. Scharmann, and S. Phelps. “Towards the Model-Based
Analysis and Design of Decentralised Economies of Things“, King’s
Research Portal, 2018.
[2] A. Poddey, and N, Scharmann. “On the Importance of System-View-
Centric Validation for the Design and Operation of a Crypto-Based
Digital Economy.“ 2019, http://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08675.
[3] R. Houben, and A. Snyers. “Cryptocurrencies and blockchain: Legal
context and implications for financial crime, money laundering and
tax evasion“, European Policy Department for Economics, 2018.
[4] Deutsche Bundesbank. “Geld und Geldpolitik“, 2017,
https://bit.ly/39A1XLm.
[5] Willis Towers Watson. “Cryptocurrency: Risk management overview“,
2019, https://bit.ly/2WMNuqZ
[6] S. Nakamoto. “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System."
November 2008.
[7] N. Hossein. “Testing the Waters of the Rubicon: The European
Central Bank and Central Bank Digital Currencies“ Journal of Banking
Regulation, 2019. https://bit.ly/2Zii6Ce.
[8] A. Berentsen, and F. Schär. “The Case for Central Bank Electronic
Money and the Non-case for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies“, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 2018, 100(2), pp. 97-106,
https://doi.org/10.20955/r.2018.97-106.
[9] C. Lagarde. “Central Banking and Fintech — A Brave New World¿‘,
Bank of England Conference, 2017.
[10] N. Hossein, and A. Prüm. “Central Banks and Regulation of Cryp-
tocurrencies“, Legal Research Programme, 2019.
[11] M. Laboure, and J. Reid. “The Future of Payments - Part III. Digital
Currencies: the Ultimate Hard Power Tool“, Corporate Bank Research,
2020.
[12] A. Berentsen, and F. Schär. “Stablecoins: The Quest for a
Low- Volatility Cryptocurrency“, University of Basel, 2019,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332464789.
[13] G7 Working Group on Stablecoins. “Investigating the Impact of Global
Stablecoins”, 2019.
[14] A. Gillick. “The Stablecoin Regulation Landscape for 2020“, Brave-
NewCoin, 2020, https://bit.ly/2ytngS2.
[15] D. Bullmann, and J. Klemm, and A. Pinna. “In search for stability in
crypto-assets: are stablecoins the solution¿‘, Occasional Paper Series,
European Central Bank, 2019.
[16] European Central Bank, “Exploring Anonymity in Central Bank
Digital Currencies“, Issue no 4, 2019.
[17] U. Bindseil. “Working Paper Series: Tiered CBDC and the financial
system“, European Central Bank, 2020.
[18] M. Kumhof, and C. Noone. “Central Bank Digital Currencies - Design
Principles and Balance Sheet Implications“, SSRN Electronic Journal,
2018. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3180713.
[19] R. Auer, and R. Boehme. “The Technology of Retail Central Bank
Digital Currency“, BIS Quarterly Review, 2020.
[20] S. Dziembowski, and S. Faust, K. Hostáková. “General state channel
networks“, Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2018.
[21] J. Coleman, and L. Horne, and L. Xuanji. “Counterfactual: Generalized
state channels“, 2018.
[22] J. Poon, and T. Dryja. “The bitcoin lightning network: Scalable off-
chain instant payments“, 2016.
[23] A. Miller, and I. Bentov, and S. Bakshi, and R. Kumaresan, and P.
McCorry. “Sprites and state channels: Payment networks that go faster
than lightning“, International Conference on Financial Cryptography
and Data Security, 2019.
[24] T. Close and A. Stewart. “ForceMove: an n-party state channel
protocol“, 2018.
[25] S. Dziembowski, and L. Eckey, and S. Faust, D. Malinowski. “Perun:
Virtual payment hubs over cryptocurrencies“, IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), 2019.
[26] S. Dziembowski, and L. Eckey, and S. Faust, and J. Hesse, and K.
Hostáková. “Multi-party virtual state channels“, Annual International
Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Tech-
niques, 2019.
[27] T. Close. “Nitro Protocol“, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2019.
[28] M. Finck. “Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe“, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2018
[29] EBA Clearing. “R2P: The missing piece of the puzzle“, Whitepaper,
2019.
10
